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Abstract
Research in psychology on reasoning has often been restricted
to relatively inexpressive statements involving quantifiers.
This is limited to situations that typically do not arise in
practical settings, such as ontology engineering. In order
to provide an analysis of inference, we focus on reasoning
tasks presented in external graphic representations where
statements correspond to those involving multiple quantifiers
and unary and binary relations. Our experiment measured
participants’ performance when reasoning with two notations.
The first used topology to convey information via node-link
diagrams (i.e. graphs). The second used topological and
spatial constraints to convey information (Euler diagrams with
additional graph-like syntax). We found that topological-
spatial representations were more effective than topological
representations. Unlike topological-spatial representations,
reasoning with topological representations was harder when
involving multiple quantifiers and binary relations than single
quantifiers and unary relations. These findings are compared
to those for sentential reasoning tasks.
Keywords: inference; diagrammatic reasoning; external
representation; quantifiers; unary and binary predicates
Introduction
In the literature of psychology of reasoning, categorical syl-
logisms, e.g., All B are A; some B are C; therefore some C
are A, have been intensively studied (for a survey, see Khem-
lani & Johnson-Laird 2012). However, it may not be true that
categorical syllogisms are most frequently used in our daily
life. Non-syllogistic forms of reasoning have attracted partic-
ular attention in the study presented in this paper, which en-
compasses the case of binary verbs (requiring two terms) and
multiple quantifiers, such as All koalas eat only eucalyptuses.
This is achieved through external graphical representations
where quantification is implicit in the formed statements; ex-
amples will be given later.
Some cognitive studies have been already beyond the tra-
ditional framework of categorical syllogisms. Johnson-Laird,
Byrne, and Tabossi (1989) dealt with syllogisms involving
verbs, for example, from the premises All A is in the same
place as some B; All B is in the same place as all C to the
conclusion All A is in the same place as all C. However,
the verbs are restricted to spatial binary ones with transitivity
or symmetry. The similar restriction was applied to the re-
cent study of Ragni and Sonntag (2012). These studies adopt
an approach from the viewpoint of mental model theory, and
propose that mental representations for multiply quantified
sentences consist simply of alphabets or dots with different
shapes representing individuals. However, such simple repre-
sentations, by way of only using spatial verbs, hardly repre-
sent general cases that use binary verbs.
Geurts and van der Slik (2005) used mixed forms of syllo-
gisms with single and double quantifiers; for example, Most
A played against more than two B and All B were C implies
Most A played against more than two C. They demonstrated
the effect of monotonicity profiles of quantifiers, rather than
specific mental representations and processes. In addition,
non-standard quantifiers, for example, cardinal (numerical)
quantifiers such as more than three (Kroger et al., 2008),
proper nouns such as a is an A (“a” is an individual con-
stant) (Politzer & Mercier, 2008; Khemlani, Lotstein &
Johnson-Laird, 2014), and proportional quantifiers such as
most and few (Ragni, Singmann, & Steinlein, 2014; Sato &
Mineshima, 2016) have been also explored. However, their
scopes of the studies were still restricted to the syllogistic
form consisting of minor, major, and middle terms. Fur-
thermore, each extended case was explored separately and
there have been few comparison between single quantifiers
and multiple quantifiers.
By contrast, recent developments in ontology engineering
cast a new light on natural language inferences, contribut-
ing to the expanding coverage of psychological reasoning
tasks. Nguyen et al. (2012) collected deduction patterns (in-
ference tasks), demonstrating the prevalence of a wide vari-
ety of forms of reasoning with quantifiers and unary and bi-
nary relations. Using novice participants, performance using
the deduction patterns as inference tasks was evaluated. It
was found that there was a difficulty gap between reasoning
with single quantifiers and reasoning with multiple quanti-
fiers, with 76.4% accuracy for (statements involving) single
quantifiers and 59.0% for multiple quantifiers. This leads to
two important questions. What makes reasoning with mul-
tiple quantifiers hard? What kind of cognitive processes of
reasoning do people take?
Amain concern of these questions is inference tasks, which
are distinguished from interpretations, but inference neces-
sarily follows the process of interpreting premises. So it
is important for the interpretation to be fixed in any way
when exploring the nature of human inferences. Indeed,
Stenning and van Lambalgen (2001) emphasized the distinc-
tion of two kind of reasoning: reasoning toward an inter-
pretation of premises and reasoning from a fixed interpreta-
tion of premisses.1 Based on the approach of using easy-to-
1In addition, Stenning and van Lambalgen clearly stated that “If
understand representations (Sato &Mineshima, 2015; Sato et
al., 2018), the current study adapts external visual represen-
tations, instead of ordinal representations of natural language
sentences, to fix the interpretation of premises and provide a
fine-grained analysis of inference (see the next section). In
particular, we focus on two distinct graphical representations.
The first exploits topology to convey information via node-
link diagrams (i.e. graphs), hereinafter called a topological
representation. The second exploits topological and spatial
constraints to convey information (Euler diagrams with ad-
ditional graph-like syntax), hereinafter called a topo-spatial
representation. Importantly, both representations convey in-
formation that is semantically rich. They give rise to state-
ments involving either single quantifiers (unary relations) or
involving multiple quantifiers along with binary relations.
Task analysis
Topological and topo-spatial representations
As mentioned in the Introduction, human reasoning with
quantifiers is necessary in a wide variety of single and mul-
tiple quantified forms, in a line with the recent develop-
ment of ontology engineering. Historically, ontologies had
been defined using some kinds of graphs (e.g., Brachman &
Schmolze, 1985) since before the formulations of descrip-
tion logics and web ontology languages (W3C OWL Work-
ing Group, 2012). As a graph representation for OWL con-
structs, this study focuses on the Simple Ontology Visualiza-
tion API: SOVA (Itzik & Reinhartz-Berger, 2014), as shown
in Fig.1a-b. Note here that SOVA graphs are fundamentally
composed of nodes and links but graphs as full ontology rep-
resentations need more variant kinds of nodes and links.
In SOVA, nodes are mainly used for classes (i.e., sets), in-
dividuals, all things (T), nothing (NT), anonymous classes
(A), natural numbers (N), minimum/maximum/exactly car-
dinalities, negation (¬), intersection (∩), union (∪), binary-
verbs with/without universal (all) restriction (∀:) and
with/without existential (some) restriction (∃:). In addi-
tion, links are used for the relations of isSubclassOf (white-
headed arrow), DisjointClasses (double-black-headed reverse
arrow), EquivalentClasses (double-black-headed arrow), In-
tersectionOf (circle-headed arrow to node∩), UnionOf (circle-
headed arrow to node ∪), ComplementOf (circle-headed ar-
row to node ¬), InstanceOf (line between concept and in-
dividual), binary-verbs (black-headed arrow), binary-verbs
with universal restriction and “everything” in subject term
(white-diamond-headed line), binary-verbs with universal re-
striction and “everything” in object term (dot-headed line).
SOVA graphs, whilst more complex than those as in Hartley
and Barnden (1997), but are still composed of topological re-
lationships in nodes and links, giving rise to semantic mean-
ing of expressive statements involving quantifiers.
As well as topological relations, spatial relations – such as
inclusion and exclusion – are available. We focus on con-
cept diagrams (Stapleton et al., 2017; 2018) as a topo-spatial
the interpretation is not fixed, what is one actually testing? (p.291)”.
representation of ontologies, as shown in Fig.1c-d. The basic
idea of concept diagrams is that Euler diagrams and graphs
(nodes and links) are merged; for a similar approach, see
Harel (1988), although that system is not expressive enough
to fully represent ontologies. In concept diagrams, rectan-
gles represent all things, named (labelled) curves represent
classes, unnamed curves are used for anonymous classes,
dots for individuals, shading illustrates the absence of things.
Also numbers and inequality symbols (≥ n, ≤ n) place car-
dinality constraints (e.g., ≥ 1 means at least one thing), solid
arrows with labels (binary-verbs with universal restriction),
dashed arrows with labels (binary-verbs with existential re-
striction), and dashed arrows with inequalities (binary-verbs
with number restrictions) are used. Furthermore, relations are
divided into two types: set-theoretical one and binary-verb.
Set-theoretical relations (e.g., SubclassOf, DisjointClasses,
EquivalentClasses, IntersectionOf, UnionOf, ComplementOf,
InstanceOf) are expressed by spatial (inclusion and exclusion)
relations of the corresponding syntactic objects. Binary-verb
relations are expressed by arrows from source objects to tar-
get objects.
Reasoning with multiple quantifiers in topological
and topo-spatial representations
We can make inferences using topological representations of
SOVA graphs and using topo-spatial representations of con-
cept diagrams. In such diagrammatic reasoning tasks, one
is asked to judge whether the diagram transformations from
premises to a conclusion are valid. Here, the premise dia-
grams are true and they are transformed into the conclusion
diagram. If the conclusion diagram is true, given the infor-
mation in the premise diagrams, the transformation is valid.
Otherwise the transformation is not valid.
Fig.1 shows examples of tasks and Fig.2 illustrates possible
intermediate representations generated by merging premise
diagrams. In each figure, (a) and (b) are SOVA cases (c)
and (d) are concept diagram (Euler or Venn diagram) cases.
Cases (a) and (c) give rise to statements about sets and unary
relations involving single quantifiers, hereinafter called the
‘single quantifier’ case, and are translated as Everything is a
darfellan & No grippli is a darfellan; therefore, nothing is a
grippli. Cases (b) and (d) give rise to the statements about
sets and binary relations involving multiple (double) quanti-
fiers, hereinafter called the ‘multiple quantifier’ case, and are
translated as Every daemonfey is related to at least one thing
in both axani and phoera under ’isGuidedBy’ & No axani is
a phoera; therefore, nothing is a daemonfey.
Here we can observe that, in reasoning with single quan-
tifiers, SOVA and concept (Euler/Venn) diagrams are similar
in that unary relations are expressed by one basic component:
SOVA links two nodes and concept diagrams use spatial rela-
tions. In SOVA, expressing binary verbs (between quantifies)
requires multiple arrows among nodes.2 Thus, transforming
2Stenning (2002, Chap.2) pointed out that graph (node-link) rep-
resentations are essentially same as sentential representations in that
(a) (c)
————————————————
(b) (d)
———————————————————————–
Fig. 1: Task examples. Two premises and one conclusion are divided by a line: (a) topological representations in single
quantifier case; (b) topological representations in multiple quantifier case; (c) topo-spatial representations in single quantifier
case; (d) topo-spatial representations in multiple quantifier case. (a) and (c) mean Everything is a darfellan & No grippli is a
darfellan; therefore, nothing is a grippli. (b) and (d) mean Every daemonfey is related to at least one thing in both axani and
phoera under ’isGuidedBy’ & No axani is a phoera; therefore, nothing is a daemonfey.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 2: Possible intermediate representations by merging premise diagrams, corresponding to the cases (a)–(d) in Fig.1
SOVA in reasoning with multiple quantifiers is expected to
require much more cognitive effort than reasoning with sin-
gle quantifiers. On the other hand, in concept diagrams, bi-
nary verbs are expressed by one arrow in which the source
and target are directly specified (since unary relations are ex-
pressed by spatial constraints instead of arrows). Thus, rea-
soning with multiple quantifiers may not require much more
effort than reasoning with single quantifiers.
We therefore make four predictions. (1) reasoning with
single quantifiers: there is no significant difference between
the two representations. (2) reasoning with multiple quan-
tifiers: topo-spatial representations are more effective than
topological representations. (3) reasoning with topological
representations: multiple quantifiers are harder than single
quantifiers. (4) reasoning with topo-spatial representations:
there is no direct correspondence between syntax and semantics.
there is no significant difference between single and multiple
quantifiers.
Experiment
Method
Participants Fourty-five undergraduate students from
classes on elementary computer science in the University
of Brighton were recruited. The mean age was 22.53
(SD = 5.92) with a range of 18− 48 years. All participants
gave informed consent and were paid for their participation.
The experiment method was approved by the CEM School
Research Ethics Panel of University of Brighton. None had
any prior training of ontology engineering or syllogistic
logic. One participant gave up on the way, and their data
was excluded. Participants were divided into two groups:
the topological group (N = 19) and the topo-spatial group
(N = 25), following a between group design.
Materials The participants in each group were presented
with premise graphs/diagrams and a conclusion graph/dia-
grams (such as Fig.1). Participants were asked to answer
the question whether the graph/diagram transformations from
premises to a conclusion were valid. As shown in table 1
(appendix), we presented 20 items in total, out of which 10
items consisted of validly transformed diagrams and 10 items
included invalidly transformed diagrams. The valid 10 items
were selected from the medium difficulty patterns in Nguyen
et al. (2012). The invalid items were created from the valid
ones with minimum changes. Furthermore, the tasks were
divided into singly quantified cases and multiply quantified
cases. The tasks were presented in one of three random or-
ders and as a paper-and-pencil test. There was no time limit
for completing the tasks, although the approximate time (30
minutes) for taking the experiment was instructed.
Procedures All participants were collected in a room. First,
the participants were provided with three pages of instruc-
tions on the basic meaning of SOVA graphs or concept di-
agrams, but not on particular rules to solve inference tasks.
Second, a pretest to check whether they understood the
instructions correctly was conducted; they were asked to
choose, from a list of three possibilities, the sentence corre-
sponding to a given graph/diagram (the potential difference of
familiarities of representations is reduced since both groups
received substantial instruction and underwent practice tri-
als: cf. Sato & Mineshima, 2015). Third, the participants
were provided with one page of instruction on the meaning
of valid transformation (entailment), with two examples of
graphs/diagrams: one was valid and one was invalid.3 After
the instruction phase, the participants were asked to solve the
main tasks on reasoning.
Results and Discussion
The data of the participants who made mistakes in more than
two items (out of five) of the pretest were removed. In the
following analysis, 3 out of 19 in the topological group, and 4
out of 25 participants in the topo-spatial group were removed.
Figure 3 shows the average accuracy rates of inference
tasks in the two groups; for each task result, see table 1 in
the appendix. The data was subjected to two-way ANOVA
for a mixed design. There was a significant main effect of no-
tation factor (i.e., topological vs. topo-apatial), F = 4.435,
p = 0.042. There was a significant main effect of factor
involving quantifiers (i.e., single vs. multiple quantifiers),
F = 4.712, p = 0.037. There was no significant interaction
effect, F = 0.426, p = 0.518. Regarding the total 20 items,
the accuracy rates in the topo-spatial group were significantly
higher than those in the topological group: 58.4% for the
topological group and 69.1% for the topo-spatial group.
3For the full details of instruction, see https://
sites.google.com/site/myardproject/exp/MateInst3
.zip?attredirects=0&d=1
A post-hoc test by Bonferroni’s method was conducted.
Regarding the reasoning with single quantifiers, there was no
significant difference: 63.8% for the topological group and
71.9% for the topo-spatial group F = 1.834, p= 0.071. This
is consistent with our first prediction. Regarding the reason-
ing with multiple quantifiers, the accuracy rates in the topo-
spatial group were significantly higher than those in the topo-
logical group: 53.1% for the topological group and 66.2% for
the topo-spatial group F = 2.938, p = 0.005. This supports
our second prediction. In the topological group, reasoning
with multiple quantifiers were significantly harder than rea-
soning with single quantifiers, F = 2.849, p = 0.007. This
conforms to our third prediction. In the topo-spatial group,
there was no significant difference between single quantifiers
and multiple quantifiers, F = 1.532, p = 0.134, consistent
with our fourth prediction.
In each comparison between valid and invalid items, there
was no significant difference at the threshold of 5% in two-
tailed t-tests. (i) 58.1% for valid items vs. 58.8% for in-
valid items in the topological group (t = −0.085); 71.9 for
valid items vs. 66.2% for invalid items in the topo-spatial
group (t = 1.059) (ii) 66.3% for valid items with single quan-
tifiers vs. 61.3% for invalid items with single quantifiers
in the topological group (t = 0.516); 79.0% for valid items
with single quantifiers vs.64.8% for invalid items with single
quantifiers in the topo-spatial group (t = 1.878) (iii) 50.0%
for valid items with multiple quantifiers vs. 56.3% for in-
valid items with multiple quantifiers in the topological group
(t =−0.682); 64.8% for valid items with multiple quantifiers
vs. 67.8% for invalid items with multiple quantifiers in the
topo-spatial group (t = −0.370). This shows that the accu-
racy performance is not different between valid and invalid
items.
General discussion
In summary, our experiment suggests that topo-spatial repre-
sentations, such as concept diagrams, can be more effective
than topological representations, such as SOVA, in reasoning
tasks containing multiply quantified information. In topolog-
ical representations, reasoning with multiple quantifiers was
harder than reasoning with single quantifiers. But in topo-
spatial representations, there was no significant difference be-
tween these cases. That is, in the topo-spatial case, the diffi-
culty of the inference task did not increase when richer infor-
mation was conveyed by the premises.
Regarding the performance difference between single and
multiple quantifiers, it is noted that the tendency of reason-
ing from topological representations is similar to those of
sentential reasoning, reported in Nguyen et al. (2012) as
mentioned in the Introduction. This finding sheds light on
the fact that mental representations elicited from sentences
contain simple components only, rather than the hybrid com-
ponents which realize some efficient way to represent tasks.
Indeed, whether model-like representations based on linked
data points (Johnson-Laird et al., 1989; Ragni & Sonntag,
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Fig. 3: Average accuracy rates of inference tasks in the topological group and the topo-spatial group. Error bars represent one
standard deviation. * refers to a significant difference at p< 0.05. ** refers to p< 0.01.
2012; Greene, 1992) or syntactic representations correspond-
ing to parsing trees/graphs of sentences (Braine, 1998), men-
tal representations to express multiple quantifiers are assumed
to be more complex than those of single quantifiers. Of
course, the complexity can be reduced, for example, by us-
ing additional inventions such as set-theoretical and spatial
notions, rather than linking of each simple component. How-
ever, the inventions seem to be rarely used spontaneously in
people not-trained in logic and mathematics. Accordingly,
Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird (1999) pointed out that the use
of Euler circles is a sophisticated method provided by school
education and is not natural as naive people’s mental repre-
sentations of quantified assertions (p.296).
Can the result that topo-spatial representations were ef-
fective in reasoning with multiple quantifiers provide some
implication to cognitive science? The findings of effective
expression of tasks can contribute to task naturalization in
the psychology of reasoning (Politzer, Bosc-Mine´ & Sander,
2017). If the aim of the current research is measuring people’s
actual logical (not puzzle solving) capability, tasks involving
inference, as opposed to just interpretation, should be set for
participants 4. Our experiment implies that the way to express
single quantifiers as spatial relations and multiple quantifiers
as topological relations, rather than both types expressed as
topological relations, is natural for the cognitive task of rea-
soning with multiple quantifiers.
Furthermore, our findings in inference or entailment judg-
ment are in contrast to those of consistency checking (Sato et
al., 2017), where topological representations were more ef-
fective than topo-spatial representations. Consistency check-
ing is a kind of logical reasoning in which people are asked to
answer the question of whether the meaning of a diagram was
contradictory. The contrast between these empirical findings
suggests that there are two distinct cognitive process under-
4For example, the errors caused by the misinterpretation of
premises should be blocked here, as discussed in the Introduction.
lying logical reasoning from external diagrams. One is a pat-
tern matching strategy, especially based on syntactic forms of
representations. While patterns of conclusions entailed from
premises are unlimited (but in the case of syllogisms, there
are some restrictions), there are certain (common) patterns of
inconsistency that are exhibited by statements. In the tasks
of consistency checking, then, the strategy to syntactically
match patterns to target representations can be reasonable.
This strategy is suitable for notations which are expressed
in a uniform way. Thus, this suggests to us why topologi-
cal representations were superior than topo-spatial represen-
tations in consistency checking tasks. Another strategy is a
more semantic. As shown in Fig.1, the conclusion such as
Nothing is an A requires reasoners to generate some new ob-
jects which cannot be found only in syntactic manipulations
of representations. Such processes are available only when
reasoners correctly understand semantic meanings of given
representations. This semantic process might be suitable for
the topo-spatial representations.
In this study, we dealt with deductive inference patterns be-
yond the forms of syllogisms, but, of course, all of them were
not covered. For example, we did not handle relations be-
tween verbs, e.g., ‘bought’ isInverseOf ‘wasSoldBy’, which
is a common style of premise in ontology engineering. So
these should be analyzed in a next step. Through further
extended studies, the nature of human reasoning in general
would be explored.
Appendix
Lists of experimental tasks and their results are shown
in Table 1. #01–10 are valid items; #11–20 are invalid
items. #01–05/#11–15 are relevant to single quantifiers only;
#06–10/#16–20 are relevant to multiple quantifiers.
Table 1: Lists of experimental tasks and their results.
No Premises⇒ Conclusion Topo.% TopoSpa.%
01. (Every A is a B) & (no A is a B)⇒ (nothing is an A) 62.5 80.1
02. (No A is a B) & (everyC is an A) & (every D is a B)⇒ (noC is a D) 75.0 85.7
03. (Every A is a (every B is a C)) & (every B is aC)⇒ (every A is aC) 87.5 85.7
04. (Everything is a B) & (no A is a B)⇒ (nothing is an A) 56.3 66.7
05. (Every A is a B) & (every A is non-B)⇒ (nothing is an A) 50.0 76.2
06. (Every A is related to at least one B under R) & (Everything that something is related to under R is aC)
⇒ (everyC is related to at least one thing in both B andC) 87.5 80.1
07. (Every A is related to at least one thing in both B andC under R) & (no B is aC)⇒ (nothing is an A) 25.0 85.7
08. (Every A is related to at least three things in B under R) & (every A is related to at most one B under R)⇒ (nothing is an A) 43.8 52.4
09. (Every A is related to at least one B under R) & (every B is nothing)⇒ (nothing is an A) 62.5 57.1
10. (Every A is related to at least four things in B under R) & (each thing is related to at most one thing under R)
⇒ (nothing is an A) 31.3 47.6
11. (Every B is a A) & (no A is a B)⇒ (nothing is an A) 75.0 71.4
12. (No A is a B) & (everyC is an A) & (every B is a D)⇒ (noC is a D) 37.5 52.4
13. (Every A is a (every B is a C)) & (every B is aC)⇒ (every A is a B) 43.8 47.6
14. (Everything is a B) & (every A is a B)⇒ (nothing is an A) 62.5 66.7
15. (Every A is a B) & (every non-B is an A)⇒ (nothing is an A) 87.5 85.7
16. (Every A is related to at least one B under R) & (Everything that something is related to under R is aC)
⇒ (Everything that something is related to under R is both a C and a non-B) 43.8 38.1
17. (Every A is related to at least one thing in either B,C, or both, under R) & (no B is aC)⇒ (nothing is an A) 62.5 85.7
18. (Every A is related to at least 1 thing in B under R) & (every A is related to at most three things in B under R)
⇒ (every A is nothing) 56.3 66.7
19. (Every A is related to at least one B under R) & (every A is nothing)⇒ (nothing is a B) 62.5 66.7
20. (Every A is related to at least one B under R) & (each thing is related to at most one thing under R)⇒ (nothing is an A) 56.3 81.0
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